Adam G. asks: I’ve always wondered how it’s possible to square claims of irrationality against the notion of subjective preferences. It seems to me that if you take the latter seriously, then nothing is irrational—maybe people don’t keep all the money in the dictator game because the subjective value they assign the stuff they could get with the extra cash is lower than the subjective value of a certain image of themselves, or an image they like to maintain in front of an experimenter. Maybe “seeing big numbers” just happens to be a scenario that increases people’s subjective valuations. Etc.
Rationality and subjectivity
Rationality and subjectivity
Rationality and subjectivity
Adam G. asks: I’ve always wondered how it’s possible to square claims of irrationality against the notion of subjective preferences. It seems to me that if you take the latter seriously, then nothing is irrational—maybe people don’t keep all the money in the dictator game because the subjective value they assign the stuff they could get with the extra cash is lower than the subjective value of a certain image of themselves, or an image they like to maintain in front of an experimenter. Maybe “seeing big numbers” just happens to be a scenario that increases people’s subjective valuations. Etc.